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Abstract  
Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules 
preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device most 
commonly added to majority rule in national is a quorum requirement. The two most 
common are the participation and the approval quora. Such rules are a response to 
three major concerns: the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, its 
representativeness (the concern with the outcome representing the will of the whole 
electorate), and protection of minorities regarding issues that should demand a broad 
consensus. Guided by a pivotal voter model, we conduct a laboratory experiment to 
investigate the performance of different quora in reaching such goals. We introduce 
two main innovations in relation to previous work on the topic. First, part of the 
electorate goes to the polls out of a sense of civic duty. Second, we test the 
performance of a different quorum, the rejection quorum, recently proposed in the 
literature. We conclude that, depending on the preferred criterion, either the 
approval or the rejection quorum is to be preferred. 
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1. Introduction  
Many political systems where direct democracy mechanisms are employed have also 
adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. “The two 
quorums — turnout requirement and approval requirement” (Qvortrup 2014: 130) 
are the devices most commonly added to majority rule in national, state/cantonal, 
and local referenda and initiatives across the world. Under a turnout or participation 
quorum1, for a particular measure to pass and the result to be considered binding, it 
is required not only that the measure collects the support of a majority of those who 
vote but also that the overall turnout surpasses a particular threshold (typically, one 
half of the electorate). Conversely, under an approval quorum, those who vote in favor 
of a proposal must not only be more than those who oppose it but also represent, at 
least, a pre-defined share of the electorate (commonly between 25 and 40%; 
sometimes more when the referendum concerns constitutional or sovereignty 
issues).2 
The introduction of quorum rules is avowedly a response to three major concerns. 
First, demanding a high turnout for the outcome of a referendum to be binding is 
linked to the fact that “low turnout rates [in referenda] (…) raise the question of 
legitimacy” (He 2002: 78). “If citizens are simply not interested in the referendum then 
the very legitimacy of the process comes into question” (Tierney 2016: 62). Second, 
differential turnout on the part of supporters and opponents of proposals raises the 
specter of “distorted” outcomes (LeDuc 2003: 172; Qvortrup 2005: 173 and 2014: 
132), where “an activated minority can defeat a position held by the majority of 
citizens,” creating a situation “in which the final verdict on the proposal, had all 
citizens voted, would have been different” (Kobach 1994: 139). Finally, quorum rules 
have also been proposed as a device with which to protect minorities against simple 
majority rule in issues that are thought to demand a broad societal consensus. For 
example, when matters of sovereignty are involved, given the fundamental 
importance of the issue at stake, or when there are ethnolinguistic minorities 
requiring protection from majority decisions, turnout or approval quora have been 
described as a way of making it difficult to change the status quo in the absence of a 
broad consensus (Şen 2015: 236), or even as mechanisms with a fundamental affinity 
with “consensual democracy” (Vatter 2000: 185). 
Understandably, the issue of quorum rules came to the fore in the aftermath of the 
June 23rd, 2016 Brexit referendum. It has been noted how “it is highly unusual that, 
particularly on issues of great constitutional significance, a simple majority of those 
                                                     
1 We use both terms interchangeably. 
2 For a detailed treatment of existing quorum rules across the world, see, for example, Kaufmann, 
Büchi, and Braun (2010). 
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who happened to vote on a particular day should be regarded as binding” (Donnelly 
2016). A widely circulated petition for a second referendum demanded, besides a 
qualified majority rule, a 75% participation quorum.3 Under such rules, the outcome 
of a simple majority for Leave might be regarded, at most, as provisional. However, 
“although with hindsight such protective and legitimizing rules might seem justified, 
no consideration was given to them in advance” (Whitehead 2017: 223). 
However, the true counterfactual of a situation where a referendum occurs in the 
absence of quorum rules must also consider how the presence of quorum 
requirements would have changed the incentives of strategic actors, be they voters 
or politicians. Anecdotal evidence and some in-depth cases studies suggest that, in the 
presence of a participation quorum, opponents of measures proposed in referenda 
have incentives to abstain, in order to render a possible majority for Change non-
binding, and cases of mass demobilization under approval quora have also been 
reported.4  
Rigorous theoretical work exploring the potential consequences of quora and the 
differences between them has attempted to address these effects systematically. 
Several models generate the prediction that adding a turnout requirement 
incentivizes abstention on the part of supporters of the status quo (Côrte-Real and 
Pereira 2004; Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães 2010a; Hizen and Shinmyo 2011) or lead 
status quo parties and interest groups to lose incentives to mobilize voters (Herrera 
and Mattozzi 2010).  
Concerning approval quora, theoretical results are less consistent, ranging from 
treating them as fundamentally equivalent to turnout quora (Herrera and Mattozzi 
2010) to seeing them as producing less distortionary effects (Laruelle and Valenciano 
2011 and 2012). Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010a) suggest the possibility that 
approval quora, like turnout quora, also depress overall levels of turnout, and that 
both types of quorum may produce the “false majorities” they were supposed to 
prevent, generating equilibria where the probability of outcomes undesired by a 
majority in the electorate is very high. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence remains very scarce. To our knowledge, only two 
works have taken this subject to the data. However, they use different methodologies 
and reach different findings, particularly regarding the effects of approval quora. 
Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães (2010b), in a study based on observational data for 
                                                     
3 “EU referendum petition signed by more than 2.5m”, BBC News, 25 June 2016. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36629324.  
4 For a variety of historical and contemporary examples, see among many, West (1985), Suksi (1993), 
Uleri (2002), Kaufmann et al. (2008), International IDEA (2008: 182). See also Offe (2017) on the 
hypothetical consequences of a participation quorum in the Brexit referendum. For cases of 
demobilization under approval quora, see Suksi (1993: 211), Svensson (1996: 38-40), and Verhulst and 
Nijeboer (2007: 19–21). 
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referenda held in current European Union countries from 1970 until 2007, conclude 
that the existence of a participation quorum does increase abstention rates 
significantly, while no such effect is associated with approval quora. Conversely, 
Aguiar-Conraria, Magalhães, and Vanberg (2016), in an experimental setup, confirm 
the results of the observational study for the participation quorum, but not for the 
approval quorum. They find that, in the lab, both types of quorum lead to lower 
participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral 
boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. The main difference is that 
the demobilizing effect of an approval quorum is less pronounced than that of the 
participation quorum. 
In this paper, we present the results of a new empirical study, using a novel set of 
experiments. We introduce two innovations to the existing empirical work. First, we 
consider the possibility that electors obtain a benefit from voting besides the one 
derived from casting the decisive vote. In particular, we allow for negative voting 
costs, representing, for example, members of the electorate that are driven to the 
polls out of a sense of civic duty. The main consequence of adding this feature to our 
model and experimental setup — thus making it more realistic (Blais and Galais 2016; 
Blais and Achen forthcoming) — is that it reconciles the results of previous 
observational and experimental approaches: we show that the participation quorum 
still demobilizes electors who favor the Status Quo, but that such effect basically 
disappears for the approval quorum. Thus, a clear message emerges for institutional 
designers: if a need to impose a quorum in referenda is felt, for example, to prevent a 
measure from passing with low overall participation from voters, a participation 
quorum is a wrong way to go about it. An approval quorum is preferable. 
The second innovation of this study is to consider the consequences of a third type of 
quorum besides the turnout and approval quora: the rejection quorum (Laruelle and 
Valenciano 2011). While the approval quorum requirement defines a share of the 
electorate that must support a measure in order for it to pass, the rejection quorum 
requirement defines a share of the electorate that must not oppose a measure in 
order for it to pass. In other words, this type of quorum implies that if opponents of a 
measure can mobilize a certain number of electors to vote against Change, then the 
Status Quo automatically prevails, even if Change receives the majority of votes. We 
analyze the effects of this type of quorum (and compare its effects with those of other 
quora) both from a theoretical perspective (using a pivotal voter model as our 
theoretical base) and from an experimental perspective. Both approaches lead to the 
same conclusion: if the objective of introducing a quorum is to make it harder for 
majorities to change the Status Quo against the opposition of minorities, then the 
rejection quorum is the best option, with the advantage of not leading to the 
demobilization of electors (a feature it shares with the approval quorum). 
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In section two, we present the different quora and illustrate the incentives they 
generate through a visual and geometrical representation. Section three presents a 
pivotal voter model, including quorum requirements and negative voting costs. 
Section four describes the Nash equilibria. Section five presents our experimental 
setup, while section six presents the experimental results. Section seven concludes. 
2. The geometry of different quora 
The different quora provide quite different sets of incentives to voters. In Figure 1 we 
present the different quora and the possible outcomes for an electorate of 9 people 
(the number we use in our experiments). Let the horizontal axis represent the people 
who vote for the “Status Quo” — call them “Conservatives” — while the vertical axis 
represents the number of people who vote for “Change” — call them “Changers”. The 
black squares represent the combinations of results that will give victory to the Status 
Quo; the white ones represent a victory for Change; and grey squares represent the 
ties, with Change and Status Quo having both a 50% chance of winning. 
 
Figure 1: Change regions (white) and Status Quo regions (black) 
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One noticeable effect of the introduction of any quorum is the increase of the “Status 
Quo” region. In other words, quora increase the set of possible results that will result 
in a victory for Conservatives. To understand that, let us look first at Figure 1.a, which 
depicts the situation with no quorum: whoever gets the majority of the votes wins. 
Then, Figure 1.b represents the most common type of quorum, the participation 
quorum. In our setup, to meet the quorum, turnout must be at least four. If 
participation is below that threshold, then the Status Quo wins. This, as we can see, 
implies increasing the Status Quo region. However, another implication is that this 
creates asymmetric incentives for Changers and Conservatives. Imagine that you 
believe that without your vote, the result will be (1, 2) — 1 for Conservatives and 2 for 
Changers. If you are a Conservative, by deciding to vote you also increase the 
probability that your preferred choice will be defeated. This is so because your vote 
will be decisive to meet the quorum. So, once the quorum is met, with a (2, 2) result, 
Change has 50% changes of winning. If you do not vote, the quorum will not be met 
and Status Quo, i.e., your preferred choice, prevails. That means that if you believe 
that the result will be (0, 3) or (1, 2), you also believe that you will be pivotal in an 
undesirable way: your vote will be pivotal to defeat your preferred option. On the 
other hand, if you are a Changer, you have a strong incentive to vote, as your vote is 
pivotal to guarantee the quorum and a victory — (3, 1). Thanks to your vote, you move 
from a sure defeat to a sure victory. 
Figure 1.c represents the second most common type of quorum, the approval 
quorum. In our setup, the quorum is met if at least three electors vote for “Change”. 
In this case, the participation of Conservatives does not affect the quorum. Therefore, 
the disincentive to vote disappears. Conversely, if you are a Changer, this quorum adds 
some incentive to vote. Not only you have to vote in order to reach the majority of 
the votes, but also to meet the quorum requirement. Note that there is a crucial 
change in the incentives: the approval quorum rule eliminates the possibility of being 
pivotal in an undesirable way. 
Finally, Figure 1.d represents the rejection quorum. In this case, if at least four 
conservatives vote, Status Quo wins, no matter if Change got four or even five votes. 
Note that this is not a mere relabeling of the approval quorum: the decision to meet 
the quorum is entirely in the hands of conservatives, and not changers. It is also not a 
mirror of the approval quorum. Take the result (5,4) under an approval quorum: 
changers meet the quorum, and, nevertheless, they are defeated. Conversely, under 
a rejection quorum, a (4,5) result means that although changers have more votes, 
conservatives meet the rejection quorum and, by doing so, win the referendum. 
In sum, the three different quora have asymmetric effects on incentives. The 
participation quorum is very different from the approval quorum, as it creates an 
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incentive for conservatives to abstain. The rejection quorum is also very different from 
the other two because the enlargement of the status quo region that we can see in 
Figure 1.d is achieved thanks to the increased mobilization of status quo supporters, 
instead of an increased demobilization, as in the other two. That means that the 
historical examples of massive demobilization by status quo supporters under 
participation (and sometimes also under approval) quorum requirements would 
probably not had happened if there was a rejection quorum instead. 
3. The pivotal voter model with negative voting costs and 
quorum requirements. 
Our experiments are an extension of that implemented by Aguiar-Conraria, 
Magalhães and Vanberg (2016), who built on Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), Levine and 
Palfrey (2007), and Coate et al. (2008) to extend the pivotal voter model to include 
participation and approval quora. 
As discussed, we depart from previous work in two ways. On the one hand, we 
consider a new type of quorum, the rejection quorum described in the preceding 
section. Second, and more fundamentally, we allow for negative voting costs, 
capturing the possibility that some electors enjoy voting (for example, they might vote 
by some sense of civic duty). This means that electors have an incentive to vote that 
is not purely instrumental, adding some realism to the model and increasing the 
external validity of the results.  
In our setup, we have nine electors (𝑖 = 1,… ,9) who decide, using majority rule, 
between two options labeled “Change” and “Status Quo”. Before voting, each player 
is randomly assigned a preference for one of the two options. 𝜇 denotes the ex-ante 
probability that an individual prefers Change . This probability is known and common 
to all players, while the preference assigned to each player is private knowledge. 
We call “Conservatives” to those who want to keep the Status Quo and “Changers” to 
the others. After learning her own preference, each player decides to either vote or 
to abstain.  
Each voter faces a cost of voting given by 𝑐𝑖, where 𝑐𝑖 is the realization of a uniformly 
distributed random variable, 𝑐𝑖 ~ 𝑈[𝑐, 𝑐]. We choose 𝑐 = −25 and 𝑐 = 75. Note that 
with this setup, on average, one-quarter of the electors will have a negative voting 
cost, meaning that they derive utility just from the act of voting. Electors with a 
negative cost will vote even if they believe that the probability of being pivotal is zero. 
An equivalent way to look at this model, which is more intuitive and, hence, easier to 
implement in the lab, is to consider that 𝑐𝑖 ~ 𝑈[0,100] and that every voter derives a 
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utility of 25 just by the act of voting. This means that, on average, one out of every 
four electors will have a utility of voting higher than the cost of voting.5 
After votes are cast and depending on the quorum rule that is in place, the outcome 
is determined. We will consider four different treatments: 
1. In the case of No Quorum, the option receiving the larger number of votes is 
chosen. In case of a tie, each option wins with 50% probability. 
2. In the case of an Approval Quorum or Participation Quorum, the Status Quo 
option wins unless one or the other quorum is met and “Change” receives the 
majority of votes cast. In case of a tie, each option wins with 50% probability, 
provided that the quorum is met. 
3. In the case of a Rejection Quorum, the “Status Quo” option wins if it meets 
the quorum threshold. If it is not met, then whoever gets the majority of the 
votes wins (and, in case of a tie, there is a 50% chance for each side). 
If “Change” wins the election, Changers obtain a benefit 425. Otherwise, 
Conservatives have a benefit of 425.6 An individual voter’s payoff is equal to the 
realized benefit minus voting costs incurred. Finally, we consider a participation 
quorum of 4, an approval quorum of 3 and a rejection quorum of 4. By choosing such 
a high value for the rejection quorum — note that a requirement of 5 would imply a 
majority of electors, making it irrelevant — we are giving this rule a good chance of 
not interfering with electors’ behavior. Therefore, the results that we will achieve 
imply that the change in the structure of incentives is meaningful. Finally, we work 
under different scenarios of the distribution of preferences among the electorate. The 
probability of supporting change, 𝜇, is varied in order to implement two “borderline 
majority” — 𝜇 =
5
9
 and 𝜇 =
4
9
 — and two “clear majority” — 𝜇 =
6
9
 and 𝜇 =
3
9
 — 
conditions.  
                                                     
5 Although it is, of course, impossible to determine the “true” share of the electorate for whom this is 
the case, the evidence suggests that 25% is not entirely implausible. On the one hand, in the United 
States, turnout in state, local or special elections that aren’t concurrent with national ballots have 
shown turnout levels below 30% and sometimes even below 20% (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). On the 
other hand, the percentage of survey respondents who disagree with the statement “If a person 
doesn’t care how an election comes out, then the person shouldn’t vote in it” has hovered on 50%, in 
spite of signs of a generational decline in the attachment of a sense of duty to voting (Blais and 
Rubenson 2013).  
6 With this calibration, the results of this experiment are directly comparable to Aguiar-Conraria, 
Magalhães, and Vanberg (2016): if we eliminate consumption voters and keep the total benefits, the 
two models will be equivalent. 
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4. Nash Equilibria 
In order to derive benchmark predictions and study the likely effects of introducing 
quora, we first calculate the Symmetric Bayes Nash Equilibrium (SBNE). Equilibrium 
predictions for these conditions are derived in Appendix 1. 
Table 1: Probability of voting for different quorum rules, odds and profiles (Nash Equilibria)  
Treatment 
Clear majority for 
Status Quo 
Borderline majority 
for Status Quo 
Borderline majority 
for Change 
Clear majority for 
Change 
(μ = 3/9) (μ = 4/9) (μ = 5/9) (μ = 6/9) 
No Quorum eq1 72 85 83 87 87 83 85 72 
Participation 
quorum 
eq1 71 88 82 88 87 83 - - 
eq2 28 100 27 99 35 85 - - 
eq3 0 100 0 100 0 99 0 87 
Approval Quorum eq1 70 92 82 89 85 84 68 74 
Rejection quorum eq1 71 70 84 65 99 62 100 64 
n = 9;  Participation quorum = 4, Approval Quorum = 3, Rejection Quorum = 4 
Legend: Conservatives Changers 
 
One first result of having a fraction of voters with negative voting costs is the reduction 
in the multiplicity of equilibria. In a similar game without negative costs, Aguiar-
Conraria, Magalhães, and Vanberg (2016) found five different Nash equilibria when 
either a Participation or an Approval Quorum were introduced. Table 1 shows that 
allowing 25% of electors to derive utility from the act of voting is enough to eliminate 
all the multiple equilibria in the case of the Approval Quorum, and reduce from five to 
three equilibria in the case of the Participation quorum.7 By itself, this justifies the 
usefulness of adding this realistic twist to the model and to the experiment. 
With the equilibria implying no show by either Conservatives or Changers now gone 
under the Approval Quorum, the second result is that turnout predictions for that case 
become very similar to the No Quorum benchmark case — the exception being the in 
the case of “Clear majority for Change”. This suggests the possibility that, if a quorum 
aims at legitimizing the referendum result by ensuring a high level of turnout without 
distorting the electorate’s behavior, the Approval Quorum might be a better choice 
than the Participation quorum. 
The third result relates to the effects of the Rejection Quorum, which, to our 
knowledge, have never been analyzed before. On the one hand, even in the absence 
of negative voting costs (result not shown here), a Rejection Quorum does not 
                                                     
7 With No Quorum or with a Rejection Quorum, we have always found unique equilibria, with or 
without negative costs. 
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generate multiple Nash equilibria. This feature makes it unique in comparison with 
other quora. On the other hand, the Rejection Quorum, in three of the four scenarios, 
is expected to increase the participation of Conservatives in comparison with the No 
Quorum benchmark (the exception is the μ = 3/9 scenario, clear majority for the Status 
Quo, where turnout for Conservatives is expected to decrease slightly while Changers 
are expected to demobilize more significantly). Therefore, if introducing a quorum 
aims at biasing the referendum results in favor of the Status Quo (as Figure 1 
suggests), the Rejection Quorum may be a good — as yet unexplored by legislators — 
alternative. For example, a popular initiative called to reverse a law from the 
parliament would face a more challenging hurdle with such quorum. 
Finally, it should be clear that the existence of a participation quorum may have a set 
of perverse effects. It may promote boycotts from Conservatives (note that 
Conservatives not voting at all is always an equilibrium) and it is even possible that it 
biases the results against the Status Quo by further stimulating turnout among 
Changers.8 
5. Experimental design 
The experiment follows a 4 x 4 design to investigate outcomes under the four quorum 
conditions (no quorum, participation quorum, approval quorum, rejection quorum) 
within each of the four preference scenarios (clear/borderline majority for/against 
Change). More specifically, we employed three different between subject (or between 
group) treatments: a Participation quorum of 4, an Approval Quorum of 3, and a 
Rejection Quorum of 4. Within each of these treatments, we conducted two within-
subject (or within group) treatments, comparing one of the quorum rules with a no 
quorum baseline condition. Finally, within each of these four conditions (i.e., within 
each group), we varied the probability that an individual voter is a “Changer” to 
implement the four preference scenarios. 
Table 2. Within- and between subject treatments 
 Between-group/subject comparisons 
                     
Within-
group/subject 
comparisons 
Approval Quorum 
(4 scenarios) 
Participation quorum 
(4 scenarios) 
Rejection Quorum 
(4 scenarios) 
No Quorum 
(4 scenarios) 
 
                                                     
8 To check if we could narrow down, even more, the set of equilibria and to add new layer of realism 
to the model, we also considered the Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE). However, given the 
equilibria were similar to the SBNE in Table 1 we do not include those results here. 
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The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Alfred Weber 
Institute of Economics at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. It involved 216 
subjects, all of whom were students of the University of Heidelberg.9 We conducted a 
total of 12 sessions (4 TQ, 4 AQ, and 4 RQ) involving 18 subjects per session. Within 
each session, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups of size 9. These 
groups remained fixed throughout the experiment, which lasted for 48 rounds.10 
Payoffs in the game were expressed as “points,” with 1 point = 0.06 EUR. 
At the start of each round, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two teams, 
labeled “A” and “B.” Although neutrally labeled, one of these options represented the 
“Status Quo” while the other represented “Change.” Next, subjects were informed 
about the existence of the quorum rule (if any), and asked to state a willingness to pay 
(WTP), between 0 and 100 points, to cast a vote in favor of their team. Each subject 
was then randomly assigned a ‘voting cost’ (VC) uniformly distributed between 0 and 
100 points. If the VC was smaller than or equal to the WTP, the subject was said to 
cast a vote, and the randomly determined VC was subtracted from her earnings in the 
game. If the VC exceeded the WTP, the subject was said to abstain and no cost was 
subtracted. After all subjects submitted their decisions, the votes actually cast were 
counted and the winning option determined as per the quorum rule in effect. Subjects 
belonging to the winning team earn 450 points if they voted or 425 if they have not 
voted. Subjects belonging to the losing side earn 25 points if they voted or 0 if they 
have not voted. Therefore, just by the act of voting, the subject receives 25 points. 
At the end of the experiment, participants were paid the average of 10 randomly 
chosen rounds, in addition to a €5 show-up fee.11 Sessions lasted between 70 and 90 
minutes. On average, each participant received 18.50 EUR. 
Within an experimental session, the probability of favoring Change varied over the 
course of 48 independent elections (experimental rounds), implementing the four 
different within-group treatment conditions: a clear majority for the Status Quo (6/3); 
a borderline majority for the Status Quo (5/4); a borderline majority for Change (4/5); 
and a clear majority for Change (3/6). In addition, the quorum rule varied, from round 
                                                     
9 The experiment was organized and recruited with the software hroot (Bock, Nicklisch, Baetge 2012). 
The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Students came from 
various disciplines (28% economics, 24% other social sciences, 15% natural sciences, 10% humanities, 
23% other). 59% of our subjects were female. 
10 Subjects were not explicitly informed that they would repeatedly interact with the same set of 
participants. It is important to note that despite this “fixed matching” scheme, subjects were randomly 
assigned to the two “teams” at the beginning of each round. 
11 This method of payment was chosen as a good compromise between avoiding paying all rounds 
(introducing wealth effects) and paying only one round (introducing additional risk). See Morton and 
Wiliams (2010: 399) for a discussion of this methodological choice.  
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to round, between no quorum (NQ) and either an approval quorum of 3 (AQ) or a 
participation quorum of 4 (PQ) or a rejection quorum of 4 (RQ).12 
As these conditions varied within the sessions, we can conduct within-subject and 
within-group comparisons between NQ and either AQ or PQ or RQ, as well as 
between-subject and between-group comparisons between AQ, PQ, and RQ. Note 
that, in the case of no quorum, the game is perfectly symmetric and, therefore, there 
is no distinction between the “Status Quo” and “Change.” Experimental instructions 
are provided in Appendix 4. 
6. Results  
6.1 Descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests 
As indicated above, we conducted 12 sessions, involving 24 groups of 9 participants. 
Since the composition of groups remained fixed throughout each session, we have 24 
statistically independent observations. When conducting non-parametric tests, we, 
therefore, use the group as our basic unit of observation and concentrate on group-
level averages. Eight groups were subjected to the “No quorum” and to each of the 
quorum treatments. All comparisons between each quorum rule and the “no quorum” 
benchmark will use data only from the eight groups who were exposed to the 
particular quorum type. We used Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to assess the significance 
of any differences observed. 
Table 3: Probability of voting for different quorum rules, odds and profiles (experimental averages) 
  
Treatment 
Clear 
majority for 
Status Quo:            
μ = 3/9 
Borderline 
majority for 
Status Quo:            
μ = 4/9 
Borderline 
majority for 
Change:          
μ = 5/9 
Clear 
majority for 
Change:       
μ = 6/9 
  No quorum 66 31 67 46 46 67 31 66 
  Participation quorum 39*** 40* 40*** 57** 25*** 69 20** 76** 
  Approval Quorum 58** 33 64 46 43 69 31 69 
 Rejection Quorum 63 27 68 35** 61*** 53*** 43*** 61 
 
 Legend Conservatives Changers 
 Wilcoxon test between No Quorum and each quorum: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                     
12 In all sessions, the probability of favoring change cycled deterministically as follows: 3/9, 6/9, 4/9, 
5/9. The sequence of no quorum / quorum conditions was counterbalanced. In half of the sessions, 
the sequence was: 8 rounds with quorum, 4 without, 8 with, etc. In the other sessions, we began with 
4 rounds no quorum, 8 with, etc. (we conduct twice as many rounds with quora because in that case 
the game is not symmetric and so we acquire fewer observations when distinguishing between 
changers and conservatives.) All random team assignments were drawn once prior to the first session 
and kept constant in all sessions. I.e. the realized numbers of Changers and Conservatives were the 
same in all treatments. 
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Table 3 shows the mean willingness to pay (WTP) per treatment. For ease of 
comparison, it mimics Table 1, merely replacing the equilibrium strategies by averages 
per treatment, also performing some non-parametric tests that help us establish the 
first set of results. 
To compare two different quorum types, we use all 16 observations, eight 
independent observations per condition. Significance will be based on the Mann-
Whitney U test for independent samples (also known as the Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
The results are in Table 4. 
Table 4: Mann-Whitney test 
Treatment 
Clear majority 
for Status Quo:            
μ = 3/9 
Borderline 
majority for 
Status Quo:            
μ = 4/9 
Borderline 
majority for 
Change: 
 μ = 5/9 
Clear majority 
for Change: 
μ = 6/9 
Participation vs 
Rejection 
Quorum 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Participation vs 
Approval 
Quorum 
*** * *** ** *** ns *** ** 
Approval vs 
Rejection 
Quorum 
ns ns ns ** *** *** *** * 
 
Legend: Conservatives Changers 
Mann-Whitney test between different quora: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ns p>0.1 
 
The main predictions of our theoretical model are confirmed, and Table 4 confirms 
that the asymmetric implications of the different quora are statistically significant.  
Table 3 shows, first of all, that the participation quorum leads to a sizeable decline of 
overall turnout. The mechanism through which this takes place is easy to see: the 
participation quorum, as predicted, severely decreases turnout among Conservatives 
in all cases, with the corresponding increase of turnout among Changers insufficient 
to compensate for the demobilization of Conservatives (except in the fourth scenario). 
Finally, the increased turnout among Changers takes place in all but one of the 
scenarios, but including those where there is a majority in the electorate favoring the 
Status Quo.  
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Concerning the approval quorum, the results in Table 3 confirm that only in the case 
where there is a clear majority for the Status Quo do we find a lower turnout 
propensity among Conservatives. No other significant differences in relation to the 
benchmark results are detected, and overall turnout levels remain close to those of 
the No Quorum benchmark. Finally, under a rejection quorum, all statistically 
significant differences consist either in increases in turnout among Conservatives or 
decreases among Changers. 
Consider the implications. First, participation quora show the potential to generate 
peculiar outcomes. On the one hand, by decreasing turnout among Conservatives, 
they create the possibility that, although Changers are a majority of the electorate and 
end up constituting a vast majority of those who vote, the quorum is not met and the 
Status Quo prevails. On the other hand, by increasing the turnout of Changers, they 
can also increase the odds of Change prevailing even when most of the electorate 
prefers the Status Quo. Second, and in contrast, the approval quorum seems to be the 
one that interferes the least with the behavior of electors when compared to the ‘no 
quorum’ benchmark. Finally, in what regards the rejection quorum, the combination 
of increasing the turnout of Conservatives, decreasing that of Changers, and enlarging 
the Status Quo region (Figure 1.d) increase the probability of a Status Quo outcome. 
Particularly for toss-up elections, the rejection quorum may tilt the election in favor 
of the Status Quo. 
Table 5: Probability that the Status Quo wins for different electorate preferences in the no quorum 
benchmark; and changes in that probability induced by the different quora. 
  
Electorate realized 
preference 
Clear 
majority for 
Status Quo 
(6,3) 
Borderline 
majority for 
Status Quo 
(5,4) 
Borderline 
majority for 
Change 
(4,5) 
Clear 
majority for 
Change 
(3,6)   
  No quorum 89 66 34 11  
  Participation quorum bias -5 -5 +4 +11  
  Approval Quorum bias +4 +4 +4 +4  
 Rejection Quorum bias +7 +15 +18 +9  
 
We can look at this more closely in Table 5, where we convert strategies under 
different quorum rules into probabilities of victory for the Status Quo. Note that in 
this table the preference scenarios are realized scenarios, not expected ones. We take 
the No Quorum as a benchmark, and then compute the effect on that probability of 
introducing a quorum. For example, in the column of “Borderline majority for 
Change”, there are four conservatives and five changers in the electorate and, without 
a quorum, the probability that the Status Quo prevails is 34%. This probability 
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increases to 38%, 38%, and 52%, under a turnout, approval, and rejection quorum, 
respectively. 
The perversity of the participation quorum can be appreciated here. Besides 
contributing to decreasing overall turnout levels, it increases the probability of a 
Status Quo outcome when Conservatives are a minority while favoring Change when 
Conservatives are a majority. Therefore, in every scenario, it increases the probability 
that the outcome is against the will of the majority of the electorate. 
Conversely, the approval quorum has a very homogeneous effect across the scenarios: 
it slightly favors the Status Quo in every single scenario. Finally, the rejection quorum 
has a similar effect to that of the approval quorum although a more pronounced one, 
particularly when the electorate is evenly divided between Status Quo and Change. 
6.2 Turnout rates 
We now introduce regression-based estimates of the probability of voting for the 
different treatments. In Appendix 2.A., we show the results of a regression model 
where WTP (“willingness to pay”) is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables 
are dummies for the combinations between the different quorum treatments, the 
different preference scenarios, and whether subjects are Conservatives or Changers. 
Given the nature of our data, we treat it as a panel, where the round number 
corresponds to time. We control for individual random effects and for a third order 
polynomial in the round number. Standard errors are robust to intragroup correlation. 
Figure 2 displays the results for the probability of voting (for these computations, we 
considered Round=25, about the mean value). To each probability, we added a 95% 
confidence interval.  
 
Figure 2: Experimental results depending on the (decreasing) probability that elector is conservative. (a) The 
effects on the behavior of conservatives. (b) The effects on the behavior of changers. Note that in the NQ 
treatment, there is no distinction between changers and conservatives. Error bars denote 95% confidence 
intervals.  
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The results basically reinforce our analysis of the previous subsection:  
1. In every scenario, a participation quorum substantially reduces the 
participation of Conservatives. Among Changers, except in the case of an 
expected “Borderline majority for Change”, in which there is no impact, their 
participation slightly increases (although slight, this result is always significant 
at 1%). 
2. The approval quorum has no statistically meaningful impact on the behavior 
of Changers. Among Conservatives, it decreases their participation when they 
expect to be in the majority (probably because they believe that Changers will 
not meet the quorum). This decrease is statistically significant at 5 and 1%, for 
the expected 5/4 and 6/3 scenarios, respectively. 
3. Finally, the rejection quorum increases the participation of Conservatives 
when they expect to be in the minority, and decreases the participation of 
Changers. This decrease in the participation of changers is significant at 1% in 
both competitive scenarios, and significant at 5% (10%) when there is the 
expectation of a landslide majority for Conservatives (Changers). 
6.3 Quorum busting strategies 
Discussing the effects of quorum rules in what concerns referenda leads us to discuss 
the possibility of boycotts, i.e. electors who decide to abstain with the firm objective 
of helping the quorum not to be met. These are electors that will abstain no matter 
how low the voting costs are. In our setup, that corresponds to choosing a willingness 
to pay equal to zero. Therefore, we created a dummy variable, call it Boycott, that 
takes the value one if WTP = 0 and zero otherwise. Then, we estimate a binary choice 
model, with the help of a random effects probit model, with the same exogenous 
variables as in the previous regression.  
 
Figure 3: Probability of boycotting the election depending on the (decreasing) probability that elector is 
conservative. (a) The effects on the behavior of conservatives. (b) The effects on the behavior of changers. Note 
that in the NQ treatment, there is no distinction between changers and conservatives. Error bars denote 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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The table with the results is presented in Appendix 3, while Figure 3 shows them in a 
visual format. It is clear that the only quorum rule that has a significant effect on the 
probability of an outright boycott is the participation quorum. All the others have no 
such effect, as one would expect from the previous discussion. This result is also 
different from that of Aguiar-Conraria, Magalhães, and Vanberg (2016), who 
concluded that approval quora also increased the probability of boycotts. Once again, 
it is clear that considering negative voting costs in the model (as well as in the 
experiment) leads to the elimination of the previously detected perverse effects of 
approval quora. 
7. Conclusions  
The adoption of quorum rules is one general aspect of direct democracy design. 
Although the empirical literature on their consequences is scarce, the existing 
evidence point towards very significant effects of such requirements. In this paper, we 
introduce two innovations to the current empirical/laboratory work. 
First, we allowed for a fraction of the electorate to have negative voting costs, 
capturing the well-known feature that, for some people, voting is not a merely 
instrumental decision, but also a civic duty. Adding this feature to the model adds 
realism and, hence, it increases the external validity of our results. As a result, we were 
able to reconcile seemingly contradictory results of previous observational and 
experimental approaches: we show that the participation quorum still demobilizes 
electors who favor the Status Quo, but that such effect disappears for the approval 
quorum, just like previous observational empirical work suggested. 
A clear message emerges for institutional designers: if a need to impose a quorum in 
referenda is felt, for example, to prevent a measure from passing with low overall 
participation from voters, an approval quorum is preferable to the participation 
quorum. Moreover, our results also show that while the participation quorum has an 
asymmetric impact on the incentives of conservatives and changers, the approval 
quorum is much less distortionary. Therefore, if differential turnout on the part of 
changers and conservatives is a concern, the approval quorum is preferable. 
Second, we added an analysis of a new type of quorum, the rejection quorum. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to analyze the effects of such quorum either with the help 
of a game-theoretic pivotal voter model or in a lab experiment. This quorum had a 
negligible impact on overall turnout; however, its effect is asymmetric among 
changers and conservatives. While it increases turnout among conservatives, it 
disincentivizes the vote of changers. The main consequence is that the probability that 
the status quo does not change increases considerably, especially in toss-up elections. 
If the motivation behind imposing a quorum is to protect the status quo, avoiding 
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changes that require a broad societal consensus, then the rejection quorum should be 
the preferred choice. 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the most common type of quorum, the 
participation quorum, is dominated by any of the other quora. Moreover, as we saw 
in section 6.1, besides contributing to decreasing overall turnout levels, the 
participation quorum always increases the probability of reaching the wrong result: it 
increases the probability that the Status Quo wins when changers are in majority while 
it favors Change when conservatives are a majority. 
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Appendix 1 ― The mathematics of the pivotal voter 
model with quorum requirements and consumption 
voters 
Assume that if ‘Yes’ wins the election, Changers obtain a benefit 𝑏. Conservatives have 
a benefit of 𝑥. Assume also that there are 9 electors (𝑖 = 1,… ,9) and that each faces 
a cost of voting given by 𝑐𝑖, where 𝑐𝑖 is the realization of a uniformly distributed 
random variable, 𝑐𝑖 ~ 𝑈[0,100]. Additionally, if an elector votes, she derives an utility 
of 25 just by the act of voting. Therefore, her net costs are 𝑐𝑖 − 25. 
Each voter knows her own cost, but only knows the cost distribution of the other 
voters. Also, each elector knows her own type and knows the probability that each 
other individual elector favors the proposal. A strategy is a function that specifies if 
elector 𝑖 votes or abstains for each possible realization of 𝑐𝑖. A symmetric Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium implies that all members of a group follow the same strategy. An 
elector will vote if the voting cost is below some threshold. Let 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛾𝑜 be those 
cutoff values for Changers and Conservatives, respectively. Taking as given the 
strategies of the other players, let 𝜌(𝑣𝑜 , 𝑣𝑠) be the probability that elector i attaches 
that, among the other 8 electors, 𝑣𝑜 vote ‘No’ and 𝑣𝑠 vote ‘Yes’.
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To derive 𝜌(𝑣𝑜 , 𝑣𝑠), note that the probability that there are s supporters of Change 
among the remaining 8 electors is given by 𝑃(𝑠; 𝑖) = (
8
𝑠
) 𝜇𝑠(1 − 𝜇)8−1−𝑠. Among the 
𝑠 Changers, only the ones whose individual costs are smaller than their cutoff value 
will vote. Therefore, the probability that 𝑣𝑠 of those will vote is 𝑉(𝑣𝑠) =
(
𝑠
𝑣𝑠
) (
𝛾𝑠
100
)
𝑣𝑠
(1 −
𝛾𝑠
100
)
𝑠−𝑣𝑠
. Similarly the probability that, among the other 8 − 𝑠 
electors, 𝑣𝑜 will vote ‘No’ is 𝑉(𝑣𝑜) = (
8 − 𝑠
𝑣𝑜
) (
𝛾𝑜
100
)
𝑣𝑜
(1 −
𝛾𝑜
100
)
8−𝑠−𝑣𝑜
. Putting all 
these together, we have: 
𝜌(𝑣𝑠, 𝑣𝑜) = ∑ (
𝑠
𝑣𝑠
) (
𝛾𝑠
100
)
𝑣𝑠
(1 −
𝛾𝑠
100
)
𝑠−𝑣𝑠
(
8 − 𝑠
𝑣𝑜
) (
𝛾𝑜
100
)
𝑣𝑜
(1
8−𝑣𝑜
𝑠=𝑣𝑠
−
𝛾𝑜
100
)
8−𝑠−𝑣𝑜
(
8
𝑠
) 𝜇𝑠(1 − 𝜇)8−𝑠 .                                            (𝐴. 1) 
Consider the case of no quorum; a Changer is pivotal if her vote is necessary either to 
break or to reach the tie. So the probability of being pivotal is given by 
                                                     
13 This is an obvious abuse of notation, as ρ(.) depends on the strategies of the other players, which also 
depend on the existing quorum requirement. We refer the reader to Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães 
(2010a) for a rigorous derivation of the model. 
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[∑
𝜌(𝑣,𝑣)
2
4
𝑣=0 + ∑
𝜌(𝑣+1,𝑣)
2
3
𝑣=0 ]. For a Conservative the probability is given by 
∑
𝜌(𝑣,𝑣)
2
4
𝑣=0 + ∑
𝜌(𝑣,𝑣+1)
2
3
𝑣=0 . 
Next, consider the participation quorum of 4. This rule introduces an additional way 
in which a voter may be pivotal. Namely, it could be that her vote is decisive in 
reaching the quorum, in addition to reaching or breaking a tie in case the quorum is 
met. For a Conservative, this means that she may be pivotal in an undesirable way: if 
her vote is decisive to meet the quorum and a majority votes in support of change, 
then her vote actually causes “Change” to win. 
In the case of an approval quorum of 3, a Changer may be pivotal either to guarantee, 
or break, the tie or to reach the quorum. In contrast, a Conservative has no influence 
in the quorum in this case, so she can only be pivotal to guarantee or break the tie, 
assuming that the quorum is reached. 
Finally, consider the case of a rejection quorum of 4, a Conservative may be pivotal 
either to guarantee, or break, the tie or to reach the quorum. In contrast, a changer 
has no influence in the quorum in this case, so she can only be pivotal to guarantee or 
break the tie, assuming that the rejection quorum is not reached. 
Putting all this together, for a changer, the expected benefit of voting and the 
equilibrium conditions are given by: 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
4
𝑣=0
+∑
𝜌(𝑣 + 1, 𝑣)
2
3
𝑣=0
] 𝑏 + 25 = 𝛾𝑠,    𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑄
[∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
+
4
𝑣=2
∑
𝜌(𝑣 + 1, 𝑣)
2
3
𝑣=1
+ 𝜌(1,2) + 𝜌(0,3)] 𝑏 + 25 = 𝛾𝑠,    𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑄 = 4
[∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
4
𝑣=3 
+ ∑
𝜌(𝑣 + 1, 𝑣)
2
3
𝑣=2 
+∑𝜌(𝑣, 2)
2
𝑣=0
] 𝑏 + 25 = 𝛾𝑠,    𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑄 = 3
[∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
3
𝑣=0 
+ ∑
𝜌(𝑣 + 1, 𝑣)
2
2
𝑣=0 
] 𝑏 + 25 = 𝛾𝑠,    𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑄 = 4
                          (𝐴. 2) 
For an Opponent, the expected benefit of voting and the equilibrium conditions are 
given by: 
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{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
4
𝑣=0
+∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣 + 1)
2
3
𝑣=0
] 𝑥 + 25 = 𝛾𝑜,    𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑄
[∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
+
4
𝑣=2
∑
𝜌(𝑣 + 1, 𝑣)
2
3
𝑣=2
−
𝜌(1,2)
2
− 𝜌(0,3)] 𝑥 + 25 = 𝛾𝑜,    𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑄 = 4
[∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
4
𝑣=3 
+ ∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣 + 1)
2
3
𝑣=2 
] 𝑥 + 25 = 𝛾𝑜,    𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑄 = 3
[∑
𝜌(𝑣, 𝑣)
2
3
𝑣=0 
+ ∑
𝜌(𝑣 + 1, 𝑣)
2
2
𝑣=0 
+ ∑ 𝜌(𝑣, 3)
5
𝑣=4 
] 𝑥 + 25 = 𝛾𝑜,    𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑄 = 4
                         (𝐴. 3) 
Note that in the participation quorum case, a Conservative may be pivotal in an 
undesirable way if her vote is decisive to meet the quorum, hence the negative signs 
in the second equation. 
For each quorum treatment, we have two equations and two unknowns. We find the 
equilibria numerically. Existence of solutions is not a problem, but there are no general 
uniqueness results. However, given that our problem is only two-dimensional and 
bounded, one can perform a detailed grid search to look for several equilibria. Only in 
the case of the participation quorum, we found multiple equilibria. 
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Appendix 2 ― Regression results: turnout rates 
We estimate a regression where WTP (“willingness to pay”) is the dependent variable. 
The explanatory variables are dummies for the combinations between the different 
quorum treatments, the values of 𝜇 and, whether subjects are conservatives or 
changers. We control for individual random effects and for the round number — which 
is like a time trend with each period corresponding to a round in the game. To correct 
for clustering, standard errors are adjusted for 24 clusters (one per group of 
players).The time trend was statistically significant up to a third order polynomial. 
Table A2.1: Random effects model of the Willingness To Pay to vote 
 
  Coefficient  SE 
Constant 21.4 1.5 
AQ, conservative in clear minority 0.3 1.7 
PQ, conservative in clear minority -12.9 3.4 
RQ, conservative in clear minority 11.9 2.5 
AQ, changer in clear minority 1.3 3.4 
PQ, changer in clear minority 8.7 2.3 
RQ, changer in clear minority -5.6 2.3 
NQ, in borderline minority 14.3 1.5 
AQ, conservative in borderline minority 10.8 2.3 
PQ, conservative in borderline minority -7.9 3.8 
RQ, conservative in borderline minority 31.7 1.8 
AQ, changer in borderline minority 14.9 1.9 
PQ, changer in borderline minority 22.9 2.4 
RQ, changer in borderline minority 4.4 1.4 
NQ, in borderline majority 34.9 1.8 
AQ, conservative in borderline majority 29.7 3.0 
PQ, conservative in borderline majority 7.4 4.2 
RQ, conservative in borderline majority 37.0 1.9 
AQ, changer in borderline majority 36.6 2.9 
PQ, changer in borderline majority 35.3 3.0 
RQ, changer in borderline majority 22.0 2.0 
NQ, in clear majority 34.7 1.7 
AQ, conservative in clear majority 26.2 2.9 
PQ, conservative in clear majority 5.4 3.2 
RQ, conservative in clear majority 34.4 1.8 
AQ, changer in clear majority 36.7 2.0 
PQ, changer in clear majority 43.5 2.4 
RQ, changer in clear majority 31.9 2.4 
Round number 1.365 0.176 
Round number to the square -0.051 0.009 
Round number to the cube 0.0006 0.0001 
 
Number of observations 10368 
Number of individuals 216 
SE adjusted for 24 clusters in Group 
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In the no quorum treatment the game is totally symmetric and, therefore,  
there is no distinction between conservatives and supporters 
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Appendix 3 ― Regression results: probability of a 
boycott 
We estimate a random effects probit model, with the same exogenous variables as in 
Appendix 2. Our dependent variable is a dummy variable, call it Boycott, which takes 
the value one if WTP = 0 and zero otherwise. 
Table A3.1: Random effects Probit on Boycotting elections 
 
  Coefficient  SE 
Constant -1.889 0.200 
AQ, conservative in clear minority -0.086 0.129 
PQ, conservative in clear minority 1.497 0.251 
RQ, conservative in clear minority -0.197 0.176 
AQ, changer in clear minority -0.002 0.201 
PQ, changer in clear minority -0.216 0.099 
RQ, changer in clear minority 0.394 0.237 
NQ, in borderline minority -0.461 0.120 
AQ, conservative in borderline minority -0.339 0.277 
PQ, conservative in borderline minority 1.386 0.193 
RQ, conservative in borderline minority -1.206 0.439 
AQ, changer in borderline minority -0.526 0.191 
PQ, changer in borderline minority -0.559 0.184 
RQ, changer in borderline minority -0.207 0.173 
NQ, in borderline majority -1.724 0.257 
AQ, conservative in borderline majority -0.877 0.262 
PQ, conservative in borderline majority 0.834 0.171 
RQ, conservative in borderline majority* - - 
AQ, changer in borderline majority -1.744 0.376 
PQ, changer in borderline majority -0.929 0.260 
RQ, changer in borderline majority -0.400 0.239 
NQ, in clear majority -1.333 0.197 
AQ, conservative in clear majority -0.544 0.278 
PQ, conservative in clear majority 1.072 0.180 
RQ, conservative in clear majority -1.564 0.428 
AQ, changer in clear majority -1.571 0.346 
PQ, changer in clear majority -1.046 0.173 
RQ, changer in clear majority -0.776 0.269 
Round number -0.002 0.021 
Round number to the square -0.000005 0.001 
Round number to the cube -0.000002 0.00001 
Number of observations 10368 
Number of groups  individuals 216 
SE adjusted for 24 clusters in Group 
In the no quorum treatment the game is totally symmetric and, therefore,  
there is no distinction between conservatives and supporters 
* Ommited because it is a perfect predictor of zero  
  
 27 
Appendix 4 ― Experiment instructions  
The following instructions were displayed (in German) on screen when subjects 
entered the laboratory: 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. If you 
have a question, silently raise your hand. 
General Rules 
 This experiment will last for approximately 90 minutes. During this time, you should not 
leave your place. 
 Please turn off and put away your mobile phone. Starting now, there should be nothing on 
your table. (A drink is permitted.) 
 Please remain quiet during the experiment, and do not speak to other participants. 
 At the end of the experiment, stay at your sear until your number is called. You will then be 
paid and you will sign a receipt. 
 You will receive further instructions after all participants have taken their seats.” 
 
After all subjects had taken their seats, an announcement was made that instructions 
for the experiment would be displayed. Subjects were told that the instructions cover 
six screens and that they would be able to navigate back and forth as often as they 
wished.  The following screens were then displayed in sequence, with “forward” and 
“back” buttons displayed at the bottom of the screen. 
 
Screen 1 
Rounds, Points, Payment 
 You will receive a 5 EUR participation fee for participating. During the experiment, you may 
attain either a higher or lower payment. 
 Your payment will depend on your decisions and those of other participants. 
 The experiment consists of 48 rounds, each of which is independent of the others. In every 
round, you will have the opportunity to earn points. At the end of the experiment, 10 rounds 
will be randomly chosen for payment. 
 Your payment will depend on your average number of points in the randomly chosen 
rounds. Points are exchanged for payment at the ratio 
1 point = 0.06 EUR 
 If you should earn a negative number of points during the experiment, the corresponding 
amount will be subtracted from your show-up fee. However, your payment will be positive in 
all cases. 
 
Screen 2 
What happens during a round? 
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 At the start of each round, every participant draws a ball from a (virtual) urn. The ball is marked 
either “A” or “B”. (Additional details regarding the composition of the urn will follow below.) 
 After this, you and 8 other participants (i.e. a group of 9 participants) will make a choice. 
 The members of the group choose between two options “A” and “B” by way of voting. (Details 
regarding the voting rules will follow below.) 
 If the option chosen by your group (“A” or “B”) matches the ball you have drawn (“A” of “B”), 
you will receive 425 points in this round. 
(Remember: 1 point = 0.06 EUR. Thus 425 points = 25.50 EUR) 
Screen 3 
Details: Urn and Balls 
 Every participant draws a ball from his or her own urn, independently of other participants. 
 The urn contains 9 balls. Some are marked “A”, the others are marked “B”. The composition 
of the urn will vary from one round to the next. 
 You will be informed about the number of balls marked “A” and “B” at the beginning of each 
round. 
 Within a given round, the number of balls “A” and “B” are the same for all participants. The 
chances of drawing a ball marked “A” or a ball marked “B” are therefore the same for all 
participants. 
Example: Suppose that the urn contains 4 balls marked “A” and 5 balls marked “B”. 
 In this example, the probability that you will draw a ball marked “A” is 4/9. The 
probability that you will draw a ball marked “B” is 5/9. The same is true for all other 
participants. 
 In this example, it will not necessarily be the case that 4 participants will draw a ball 
marked “A” and 5 participants will draw a ball marked “B”. For example, it is possible 
(though unlikely) that all participants will draw a ball marked “A”. 
Screen 4 
Details: Voting 
 In each round, every participant will decide whether he wishes to vote or whether he wishes 
not to vote. 
 If the participant chooses to vote, a certain number of points will be initially subtracted from 
his total in that round. We will refer to the number of points subtracted as his voting cost. 
 Your voting costs lie between 0 and 100 points. They will be randomly determined for each 
participant at the beginning of every round. Every number between 0 and 100 points is 
equally likely. (Remember: 1 point = 0.06 EUR. Therefore 100 points = 6 EUR.) 
 Every participant is assigned his own voting cost in each round. In general, these costs will 
therefore differ between participants. 
 If a participant decides to vote, then a vote for the option corresponding to his ball is 
automatically counted. 
 In addition, each participant who decides to vote will receive 25 points. We refer to this as a 
voting bonus. 
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Example: Suppose you draw a ball marked “A”. If you choose to vote, then one vote for 
option “A” is automatically counted. In addition, you will “pay” the voting cost and receive a 
voting bonus of 25 points. 
Screen 5 
Details: Your Decision 
 In order to better understand your decision (vote or not vote), we will proceed as follows. 
 In each round, we will ask you to state how much you are willing to pay, at most, in order to 
cast a vote in this round. 
 Important: We will ask this question before we inform you of your actual voting cost in the 
round. (However you will know the composition of the urn, the ball you have drawn, and the 
voting rule that is in effect.) 
 If your voting cost is smaller than or equal to your stated willingness to pay, you will cast a 
vote and “pay” the voting cost (not your stated willingness to pay) and receive a voting 
bonus of 25 points. 
 If your voting cost is larger than your stated willingness to pay, you will not cast a vote and 
you will not receive the voting bonus. 
 Your statement has no influence on your actual voting cost. This cost is randomly 
determined already before you make your decision.  
Screen 6:  
Parts in green varied depending on treatment. Bold type was red in original. 
Details: Voting Rule 
 After all participants have decided (as described above) to vote or not to vote, the votes cast 
are counted. 
 Recall that when a participant votes, a vote for the option corresponding to his ball is 
automatically counted. 
 In principle: The option which receives the most votes is chosen. In case of a tie, a random 
choice is made (50/50). 
 However: In addition, in some rounds, there will be a so-called quorum rule. This rule states 
that one of the two options (A or B) will be automatically chosen if [PQ: “fewer than 4 votes 
are cast.” ; AQ: “… fewer than 3 votes for the other option are cast.”; RQ: “… at least 4 votes 
for that option are cast.”]. 
Example: Suppose the quorum rule states: “If [PQ: fewer than 4 votes; AQ: fewer than 3 votes for 
B; RQ: at least 4 votes for A] are cast, option A will automatically win.” Then if, for example, 
[PQ/AQ: 2 votes for option B and one vote for option A; RQ: 5 votes for B and 4 votes for A] are 
cast, option A will win despite the fact that B has a majority of the votes.  
 You will be informed prior to making your decision about whether a quorum rule is in effect, 
and which option will win if the quorum is not met. 
Note: If the option corresponding to your ball wins, you will receive 425 points, even if you have 
not cast a vote. 
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Screenshot 1: drawing a ball 
 
Screenshot 2: Input willingness to pay  (rejection quorum version) 
 
Screenshot 3: Feedback after cost draw (rejection quorum version) 
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Screenshot 4: Feedback at end of round (rejection quorum version) 
 
